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Do Announcements of Dividend Payment Frequency Change Matter? 
Jinxiu Guo 
 
Recently, we observe an increasing number of firms declaring monthly dividends. Although 
dividend policy itself has been in the focus of corporate finance literature, changes in dividend 
payment frequency are not given much attention. The objective of this paper is to investigate the 
significance of dividend payment frequency changes. This paper specifically analyzed cash 
dividends and sought to study the potential effect of dividend payment frequency change 
announcements on the returns of stocks. Meanwhile, this paper serves as an important way of 
understanding corporate policy decision. To examine the subject, we implement a standard event 
study of dividend payment frequency changes to detect the market reactions through measuring 
the abnormal returns occurred during the announcement period. The study found a rising trend in 
stock returns during frequency increase announcements and vice versa. It therefore reveals that a 
change in dividend payment frequency is relevant that are perceived as newsworthy in the 
market, supporting that signaling effect apply equally well to the dividend frequency changes. 
Further multivariate analysis reveals that the correlation between event period abnormal returns 
and frequency change remain significant after controlling for other unconditional firm 
characteristics.  
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When it comes to the significance of dividend policy, the topics involving the decision to pay or 
not to pay dividends, how much to pay have been highly explored. While the issue of how 
investors would react to a change in dividend payment frequency is not given much attention in 
financial literature. Dividend policy has been defined for a long time as the process where a firm 
decides amount to be paid to the shareholders as a part in their profit (Khan et al., 2011). Until 
Ali (2013) update the definition by assuming dividend payment frequency as part of dividend 
policy, the dividend policy relating to payout frequency is becoming an emerging issue but 
remain less explored by finance researchers. If dividend payment frequency is a management 
decision, it is natural to view it as a value enhancing approach. The objective of this paper is to 
investigate the significance of dividend payment frequency changes by identifying the market 
reactions to frequency changes.1 Abnormal share price movement is expected to appear if the 
market value the announcement of frequency change as significant. Based on the prior relevant 
findings about the significance of dividend changes, we are seeking an answer to the question 
that whether the investors will react to a change in payout frequency in a similar manner as to a 
change in dividend policy such it affects the share price of the firm. In turn, giving us insight into 
the potential incentives of managers changing their dividend frequency. To achieve that 
objective, we collect a sample of firms with changes in dividend payment frequency and attempt 
to capture the market reactions by measuring the unexpected share price variations surround the 
announcements of dividend payment frequency changes. In a multivariate analysis, we further 
examine the market reactions specifically related to the frequency change by controlling for 
other firm specific factors. 
According to the signaling hypothesis, managers are more knowledgeable about the strategy of a 
firm than outside investors, thus they tend to use dividends as a signaling mechanism to convey 
implicit information about firm’s future prospects to the market in order to close the information 
gap. From the standpoint of stockholders, they view the dividend announcements as a reflection 
of management’s assessment of firm’s future profitability. This is also referred to as “the 
information content of dividends” (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Specifically, an increase in 
 
1 We consider only cash dividends in the empirical tests in this paper 
2 
 
dividend gives strong signals about the bright future prospects of the company thus trigger 
positive stock returns due to higher market expectations. While dividend decreases are perceived 
as negative signals about the company’s future cash flow which lead to adversely market 
reactions. Inspired by Ali (2013), we regard dividend frequency changes as a form of dividend 
policy and expect the firms send new information about firm’ strategy to investors by a change in 
dividend payment frequency. If the disclosures of dividend frequency changes do have 
information content, in other words, the market perceive the frequency changes as valuable 
information containing firm’s future profitability, we conjecture that the frequency increases 
signal as “good news” and a dividend frequency decline signals as “bad news” conversely. Since 
cash dividends are generally paid from future earnings, firm may not sure they have regular cash 
inflows to be paid out as regular cash dividend if they change from high to low frequency and 
vice versa.2 In this vein, we expect rising (falling) market valuations of firms associated with the 
corresponding signals perceived by investors during the frequency increase (decrease) 
announcement period. Additionally, with respect to the information content of dividends, there 
exists another explanation that the firm valuation is also affected by the investor cognition of a 
stock. Investors tend to become more willing to invest in a stock that they are aware of (Ferris et 
al., 2010). According to the information content models of Miller and Rock (1985), dividends 
contain information about managerial expectations regarding firm’s future performance. Daniels 
et al. (1997) tested the “information content of dividend hypothesis” and provide empirical 
evidence showing robust relation between dividends and firm’s future permanent earnings. That 
is to say, more frequent payments signal more information for investors to the value firms. This 
suggests that frequency with which dividends are paid affect the degree of investors awareness of 
the firm, which is in turn influencing investors’ portfolio selection.  
Besides of the aspect of signaling hypothesis, there are other reasons that affect an investor’s 
valuation of a dividend distribution. Such as investor preference, which is first introduced by 
Shefrin and Statman (1984), that there is a tendency of investors to favor cash dividends over 
capital gains. According to the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), investor’s utility 
curve is steeper near the origin, thus a $2 dividend plus 8 % of profitability produce higher utility 
 
2 We expect seasonal industries to not pay frequent dividends e.g. monthly dividends because of seasonal cash 
inflows and provide statistics later on. 
3 
 
equal to u(2) + u(8)) than the utility associated with the stock gains 10% without dividends paid 
(u(10)). Similarly, Ferris et al. (2010) imply that investors prefer more frequent dividend 
payments based on prospect theory. Because of the concavity of individual’s utility function, 
investors treat each dividend as a separate gain and achieve higher level of utility from more 
frequent payments. It still makes sense to explain by the bird in the hand theory that investors 
prefer higher frequency to lower frequency to reduce uncertainty about future cash payments. 
Obviously, investors afford less risk when they are accepting relatively near dividends payments. 
Thus, in spite of an identical payout level, this preference on higher frequency can effectively 
influence the firm valuations. Furthermore, the clientele effect demonstrates that different types 
of investors are attracted to particular kind of dividend policy. Hence, changes in dividend policy 
will form new sets of clienteles which lead to stock price changes. 
Relying on the theoretical foundations of dividend signaling theory and investor preference 
theory, this paper argues that the market will respond positively to the dividend frequency 
increase announcements and negatively to dividend frequency decrease announcements, which 
can be reflected in the abnormal stock price. In this article we explore the role of dividend 
frequency changes in explaining the firm valuation effects during the announcement period. The 
first part of our analysis is to examine the relation between a firm’s abnormal returns and its 
announcement of frequency change. To facilitate the examination of the announcement impact, a 
univariate event study is employed for a sample of 96 US firms experiencing the changes of 
dividend payment frequency for the years between 1970 and 2019. Consistent with the 
hypothesized effect of changes in dividend payment frequency, there is a significant positive 
abnormal return appears when a firm change to pay higher frequent dividends. Conversely, firms 
are penalized in the market when they convert to pay dividends with lower frequency. This 
finding certainly suggests there is an informational link between the dividend payers and 
shareholders of the firm when a change in dividend payment frequency is happening.  
However, there are other firm-level characteristics that might also account for the significance of 
abnormal returns during announcement period. As suggested by Barros et al. (2020) that firm’s 
specific characteristics have an impact on dividends. To determine the specific effects of target 
event on firm’s stock return performance, our second tests focus on a multivariate analysis by 
regressing the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on frequency changes while controlling for a 
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number of other influence factors. The results indicate that the positive correlation between 
frequency change and CARs remain statistically significant. Therefore, supporting our 
hypothesis that the change in dividend payment frequency is relevant on firm’s market 
valuations. 
This paper contributes to the existing knowledge and findings in corporate finance field in 
various ways. Firstly, while a wide range of researchers examine the relationship between 
corporate payout policy and firm financial performance, there is a lack of literature on the effects 
of dividend payment frequency. Thus, this research provides supplementary evidence on the 
short-term effect of changes in payment frequency on firm’s share price. Secondly, there is a gap 
in the literature on the influence of monthly dividend payment, which has becoming an emerging 
dividend distribution form applied by an increasing group of firms. This paper fills this hole by 
particularly adding monthly dividend involved frequency change into account. Although we find 
limited support on the extra influence of monthly dividends, this paper still has several 
implications for current and future researchers. Thirdly, learning from prior relevant papers 
(Ferris et al., 2010; Kambeu, 2017), this paper concentrates on research firms listed in U.S. 
liquid market to avoid the illiquidity problem and legal regime variations. Also, we apply for a 
sufficient period length during sample selection process to diversify the event observations.  
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. In the subsequent paragraph (Section 2) we 
integrate the theoretical frameworks and empirical studies concerning the relevance of dividend 
policy. Combined with the improved definition of dividend policy, it establishes the connection 
between dividend payment frequency change and firm’s market valuations by signaling 
hypothesis and investor preference theory. In addition, it also discusses the findings of prior 
relevant papers studying on the significance of dividend payment frequency used to develop this 
study’s hypotheses. Sections 3 describes the data source used in the paper, discusses the sample 
selection process, and outlines the distribution of sample firms briefly. The empirical 
methodology of event study and multivariate analysis concerning the relationship between the 
frequency change and firm valuations are introduced in Section 4. The empirical results are 
analyzed in section 5. Finally, we close the paper with a brief summary, followed by the 
limitations of this research and specific recommendations for further work in Section 6. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Relevance of Dividend Policy 
According to the seminal dividend irrelevance proposition of Miller and Modigliani (1961), 
given that in a perfect capital market dividend policy should have no effect on the wealth of 
shareholders. Regardless of how a firm distributes its income, its value is solely determined by 
its investment decisions. Therefore, financial managers cannot enhance the firm value by 
changing their dividend policy (Stulz, 2000). However, in the real world, the existence of market 
imperfection issues makes the dividend policy relevant (Al-Hasan et al., 2013; Luvembe et al., 
2014).  
Much literatures by the dividend relevance supporter document that dividend policy is associated 
with firm valuation effect such that dividend cuts (increases) cause share price to drop (rise) 
unexpectedly. The most frequently cited explanation for the share price changes following the 
dividends announcements is “the information content of dividend” as well as signaling 
hypothesis. This hypothesis state that dividends are used by firms as signaling device to convey 
information to the market. This debate can be traced back to the famous investigation of dividend 
policy stressed by Lintner (1956) that dividend policy always signal information to the market, 
as the prudent foresighted managements only increase dividends when they are certain about the 
firm’s future income. Interestingly, “the informational content of dividends” was alluded by 
Miller and Modigliani (1961), which claim that the informational content of dividends is an 
attribute of dividend payments and state that dividend changes provide occasion for the stock 
returns as they signal new information about the firm’s profitability. Essentially, the signaling 
hypothesis is based on the information asymmetry where managers have access to private 
information regarding the firm’s current and future financial position that is not available to 
outside parties. Due to the existence of asymmetric information, the intrinsic value of firms 
cannot be accurately measured by the market share price. To clear the information gap, managers 
use dividends policy as communication device to share the asymmetric information. Unlike 
managers, stock owners are less aware of the internal operations of a firm. They usually interpret 
dividend changes as a form of information sent by managers, which enables them to estimate 
future earnings more accurately. For instance, when the firm announces to increase its dividend, 
investors will perceive the dividend increases as positive management assessment of firm’s 
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future prospects, which motivates them to bid up the share price accordingly. Subsequently, this 
argument receives supportive explanations from a group of analysts (e.g., Pettit, 1972; Charest, 
1978; Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985) who contend that dividend payment is 
regarded as the only reliable signaling tool for managers to supply information to investors, thus 
decisions made by managers to change dividend payments greatly affect what investors expect 
about the firm, i.e., a dividend increase (decrease) is taken as good (bad) news about the firm’s 
future earnings, on which the firm’s market value largely hinges. As further studies based on the 
notion of information asymmetries, a group of researchers including John and Williams (1985), 
John and Williams (1985) et al. declared that the dividend changes are not actions that just 
happen to have information content, instead, the information which reflect the future earnings is 
sent intentionally to make a proper valuation at some cost. Tax-based signaling models of 
Bhattacharya (1979) argue that higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains are necessary 
conditions for dividends to be informative, which can be regarded as signaling cost (Bernheim, 
1991; Amihud and Murgia, 1997). This is not to say, of course, that manager always tell the 
truth, there is particular instance that managers possibly attempt to mislead investors through 
manipulations of announcement effects. 
Although, taking advantage of asymmetric information, managers are likely to use dividend 
policy to transmit signals to the local market and create firm value. In the meanwhile, with the 
concern about affecting the stock price, management always take signaling effect of dividends 
into account while making dividend decisions. That is to say, there is an impact of market 
reactions on the dividend policy. Managers believe firms should have some long-term target 
payout ratio. With the purpose of maximizing share price continuously, they prefer to sustain a 
smooth dividend stream, increase dividends slowly and incrementally as earnings increase. They 
are reluctant to cut dividends due to the fear of negative signaling effect. A change in dividends 
is usually triggered by a major unexpected and persistent change in earnings. As described early 
by Lintner (1956), firms only increase dividends when management believes that earnings have 
permanently increase. In a similar vein, Jagannathan et al. (2000) predicted that dividends 
represent firm’s commitment for future permanent cash flow. It is true that managers are unlikely 
to promise future payout when they are uncertain about sufficient future cashflow. Once the 
unexpected change in dividend happens in one company, such as lowering the dividend, it will 
be interpreted by investors as a sign that the company is experiencing financial distress or less 
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profitable investment, thus losing shareholders confidence and reputation around the markets, 
consequently leading to adverse impact on firm value (Ghosh and Woolridge 1988; Luvembe, 
2014). In an attempt to reduce disappointment and to avoid unwanted market reactions, firms 
always consider prudently before making decision to change dividend payment and try their best 
to smooth the dividends. In essence, the above analysis implies that managers should set their 
payout policy not depend on current and past earnings, but on expected long term growth (Khan 
et al., 2011). In light of this, it is reasonable to evaluate firm’s actions to adjust dividend policy 
as management expectations and confidence as to the future performance and prospects of the 
firm. 
An alternative explanation, the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis is going back to Gordon (1963) and 
Lintner (1962) and supports the positive relation between dividend policy and firm value. The 
characteristics of investor such that rationality and risk-averse let them prefer the “bird in the 
hand” dividends from stock investing to the “two in the bush” of potential capital gains in the 
future due to the inherent uncertainty. In comparison with uncertain capital gain in the future, 
dividends provide investors reliable income and a source of return even during down markets, 
giving reasons for the higher valuations of the dividend paying firms. Subsequently, Shefrin and 
Statman (1984) illustrate the investor preference for cash dividends over capital gains. Based on 
the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), investors utility curve tends to be steeper 
near the origin. Investors obtain higher utility from a $2 dividend plus 8 % of profitability than 
the utility associated with the stock gains 10% without dividend payments, since they value the 
capital gains and dividends separately. According to the self-control theory (Thaler and Shefrin, 
1981), investors might be willing to pay a premium for cash dividends in pursuit of self-control. 
Another view claims that the movement in a company's stock price according to the demands 
and goals of its investors, which is the clientele effect. Miller and Modigliani (1961) initially 
demonstrated that different types of investors are preliminarily attracted to certain type of 
dividend-paying stocks. In the same vein, Pettit (1977) stated the investor tendency to hold 
portfolios of securities that have particular dividend paying characteristics. These investor 
demands come in reaction to market imperfections, such as tax and transaction cost. For 
instance, institutional investors tend to be attracted to invest in dividend-paying stocks because 
they have relative tax advantages over individual investors (Allen et al., 2000). From the 
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proposition of transaction costs, small investors relying on regular income from dividends may 
prefer high and stable-dividend stocks since they cannot afford the significant transaction costs 
associated with shifting portfolio allocation. Some would instead prefer a company that doesn’t 
pay dividends at all but invest towards profitable project for future capital gains so that avoid 
transaction costs associated with reinvesting the proceeds of dividends (Bishop et al., 2000). 
Similar to bird-in-the-hand hypothesis, another possible dividend clientele effect is related to risk 
clienteles that high-payout stocks tend to be less risky than low-payout stocks; thus, and based on 
the risk factor, dividends may attract certain clientele investors (Scholz, 1992). Hence, when a 
company's policy alters, investors will adjust their stock holdings accordingly. As a result of this 
adjustment, stock prices may fluctuate. 
Numerous financial researchers have tried to find the empirical support for the “information 
content of dividends” by investigating the impact of dividend distributions on firm value.3 There 
is, surely, general agreement that changes in dividend policy have an obvious bearing on the 
stock price changes. Watts (1973) was among the first to test the information content of 
dividends while his tests suggest that the information conveyed by the unexpected dividend 
changes is trivial. In contrast, Pettit (1972) observed that market favorably react to 
announcements of dividend announcements with a corresponding significant higher share price. 
In the following, Pettit’s (1972) findings receive supportive results that there is a positive 
relationship between dividend payment and market price of shares from Aharony and Swary 
(1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Woolridge (1983) and Kalay and Lowenstein (1985). Thus, 
it is not surprising that many theories (e.g., Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller 
and Rock, 1985) assume that dividends do contain information about the firm’s future cash flow. 
Bajaj and Vijh (1990) explained the significant abnormal returns around dividend 
announcements by the existence of dividend clienteles. They proposed that the price reactions to 
the dividend changes are partially determined by the marginal investors’ dividend yield 
preferences. Michaely et al. (1995) offer evidence that the market tends to become more 
pessimistic toward dividend decreases reflected in more severe negative abnormal returns in 
comparison with dividend increases. Chen et al. (2002) studies among the firms that change 
dividends frequently and find no significant association between dividends and stock returns, 
 
3 Two popular dividend Models from Walter (1956) and Gordon (1956) on dividends and firm value confirm that 
dividend policy affects the value of the enterprise. 
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suggesting that the signaling function of dividends is established on the basis of sustainable 
dividend distribution.4 
 
2.2 The Significance of Dividend Payment Frequency Change 
As shown above, the correlation between dividend policy and firm value is most intensely 
studied on the decision of whether a firm pay a dividend or not and the increase or decline of 
dividend payment amount. While the information contained in a change of dividend payment 
frequency with given level of dividend has received less attention. It is probably owing to the 
fact that frequency of payment is assumed as of secondary importance once the level of payment 
is decided (Ferris et al, 2010). Can a change in dividend payment frequency be perceived as 
valuable information by investors such it affects the share price of the firm? Based on Ali 
(2013)’s argument that dividend policy involves not only the form and the size of dividend 
payments, but also the frequency of dividend payments, we assume conversions of dividend 
payment frequency as part of dividend policy and research on the potential valuation effect 
arising from a change in dividend payment frequency.  
Acting as pioneers to examine how dividend payment frequency influence the firm value across 
global capital markets, Ferris et al. (2010) conjecture a positive relationship between dividend 
payment frequency and firm value from the perspective of investor preference. Relying on the 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and mental accounting developed by Thaler 
(1980), investors treat each dividend as a separate component of total equity return and derive 
higher utility from receiving more frequent dividends. This could also be explained by the bird-
in-the-hand hypothesis, investors prefer more reliable dividend income to uncertain capital gain 
in the future and reflect this preference in a higher valuation of a dividend distribution firm. 
Similarly, the risk-averse investors should prefer near dividends to future dividends since the 
higher frequency dividends further reduce uncertainty about future cash payments. The higher 
uncertainty, the higher risk investors need to afford which affects the rate of profit required by 
shareholders and the consequent valuations of the stock. As claimed by Barberis and Huang 
 
4 The tax-effect hypothesis suggests that low dividends increase stock value due to the higher tax rate on cash 
dividends. But do not expect this to be relevant for this paper since we are using U.S. listings firms only. 
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(2001) that the sooner the investors receive payments, the lower risk they would undertake. 
Hence, it is natural to expect higher market preference for the frequently paying firms.  
The empirical findings of Ferris et al. (2010) reveal that the positive correlation applies equally 
well between dividend frequency change and firm value. The event study of dividend payment 
frequency confirm that firms gain positive abnormal return surrounding the date when they 
announce the dividend will be paid more frequently. But the firms choose to reduce their 
dividend frequency receive adverse market reactions. They conclude that the market response to 
the changes in dividend payment frequency in a consistent way as the prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting theory (Thaler, 1980) expect. Moreover, 
they observe firms paying dividend more frequently appear more valuable with higher market-to-
book ratio than those paying low frequency firm. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that firms want 
to send the signal that they expect high future growth by increasing payment frequency, since 
growing stocks generally exhibit high price-to-book ratios.  
Most recently, Kambeu (2017) analyze the significance of the announcement of dividend 
payment frequency change from quarterly to bi-annual in one specific firm listed on the 
Botswana Exchange. Contrary to their initial argument, the results did not show significant 
abnormal returns during the frequency changing period. Even so, they are still adamant that the 
firm’s decision to change its dividend payment frequency matters and speculate the illiquidity 
nature of the target stock market probably lead to the contradiction, because the stock prices 
during the highly illiquid market become less responsive to new information.  
This paper serves as complement to make up the lack of literature on the effects of dividend 
policy about payment frequency. In particular, as the monthly dividend is becoming an emerging 
form of dividend distribution, we attempt to examine extra market reactions to monthly involved 
frequency change, which possibly explain the increasing number of monthly dividends payers. 
By applying for a longer time horizon and limiting all sample firms in the liquid U.S. listings 
during the data-gathering process, we tend to research on a more homogenous setup without 
illiquidity problems. As compared with past relevant studies, same tax regime with only U.S. 
listing rules out tax theory to a certain degree. Importantly, same market usually has similar 
types of investors which enables us to research monthly dividend changes easily as compared to 




Summarizing above theories and empirical finding, now present all arguments which are in favor 
for Hypothesis 1. Depending on the investor preference theory, individual investors prefer to 
invest in a more frequent dividend paying stock. Because of the concavity of individual’s utility 
function, investors treat each dividend as a separate gain and value frequent payments higher. It 
is easier to understand if we further extend the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis. Investors prefer 
dividends to capital gains due to the inherent uncertainty. Similarly, the higher frequency should 
further reduce uncertainty about future cash payments, offering investors higher level of 
certainty. Considering the “information content of dividends”, dividend frequency changes might 
signal as managerial expectations about firm future earnings as informed by dividend increases 
and decreases. As dividends are mainly drawn from future permanent cash flow, which are 
determined by future earnings. Hence, future earnings of firm determine not only the firm’s 
ability to pay dividend, but also the dividend frequency the firm elect to pay (Ferris et al. 
(2010)). Investors might perceive the occurrence of dividends frequency increases as good news 
indicating firm’s positive future cash flow. While decisions made to reduce payment frequency 
might signal investors that this firm is experiencing poor operating conditions.  
In addition to the arguments presented in above literature, there might be additional reasons to 
interpret the association between dividend payment frequency and firm value. As noted earlier in 
signaling hypothesis, dividends are viewed as continuing information about firm’s future 
earnings, more frequent dividend means more dividend announcements and more news about 
future earnings provided to the investors. Contrarily, less frequent dividend payments decrease 
the breadth of investor awareness of the firm. This kind of unknown issues increase the level of 
risk taken on by investors thus require a higher rate of return when they are valuing the firm. As 
developed by Merton (1987) that, individuals are more willing to put securities of which they are 
aware into their investment basket. In summary, changes in dividend frequency can make a 
difference to the perception on firm value by influencing the breadth of investor cognizance of 
the firm.  
It seems plausible to connect the effect of the breadth of investor cognizance to the investor 
preference theory by the link of the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis. Accordingly, the market 
satisfaction with the stock holding not only comes from profit maximization, but also from the 
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higher level of certainty about stock investing. Then it is understandable that investors prefer to 
make investment to those stocks which they are more aware of because they derive higher level 
of certainty. This view holds in the opposite direction that fewer news cognizance of the firm 
arising from lower frequent dividends cause adverse firm valuations due to high uncertainty.  
Overall, both dividends signaling hypothesis and investor preference theory draw the same 
conclusion in terms of the market reactions to dividend frequency changes, expecting that market 
valuation of firm is an increasing function of the dividend payment frequency, although in two 
aspects of interpretations. In light of the aforementioned theories and literature, the present study 
aims to test the first hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1   The occurrences among firms transforming their current dividend payment 
frequency to higher (lower) level are correlated to the positive (negative) abnormal returns 
surrounding the announcement period.  
Beyond the payment frequency, firms tend to adjust the overall dividend amount at the same 
time. Considering the effect of annual payout change coinciding with frequency change 
announcements, this paper investigates an additional hypothesis of Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1(a) The firms who announce to pay more frequent dividends receive higher positive 
abnormal returns if they increase annual dividend payment amount at the same time. 
Based on the literature provided above, it is clear that there is a gap in the literature pertaining to 
the value of monthly dividends for stock investors. As a further examination of frequency 
change, we specifically aim at frequency increase sample which convert to pay monthly 
dividends, which is the form of dividend distribution applied by an increasing group of firms. 
According to the clientele effect, specific investors are attracted to firms with different dividend 
policy. Thus, changes in dividend payment frequency may induce investors to adjust their stock 
holdings. We expect the firms that convert to pay monthly dividends will attract a new group of 
monthly dividend induced clienteles who take dividends as regular source of income and prefer a 
regular cash dividend paid in higher frequency over a low-frequency payment, which lead to 
different clientele structure and higher market valuations of the stock. 
Hypothesis 2   Conversion of dividend payment frequency to monthly generates higher abnormal 
returns during announcement period.  
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3. Data and Sample Construction 
3.1 Data Sources 
Our dataset is constructed from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) and Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Data on the firm’s dividend 
distribution is required in the first step in order to identify the target firms that change their 
dividend payment frequency. The “CRSP Daily Stock Event – Distribution” file from CRSP 
database provides us the specific daily stock distribution information such as distribution code 
and dividend declaration date with corresponding identifying information, such as permno and 
cusip. To estimate the expected stock return performance and calculate the event period 
abnormal returns during the univariate event study. Both daily stock return data and daily market 
returns are collected from CRSP daily return files. Fama French daily research factors are 
collected from Ken French Website. For further multivariate analysis, cumulative abnormal 
returns obtained from event study are calculated from the daily stock price data. Compustat 
Fundamental Annual datafile in is used to retrieve the company level fundamentals including 
firm name, gvkey and business description, which are used to filter the non-real firms. Firm level 
financial information is obtained from Compustat. 
 
3.2 Event Sample Collection 
Our sample period comprises dividend distribution information from January 1, 1970 to 
December 31, 2019, to ensure a sufficient number of observations. In line with the literature and 
to avoid illiquidity issues, we require our securities to be listed at U.S. stock markets. We use the 
four-digit distribution code to identify dividend payment frequency changes. The first digit 
describes the type of distribution; the second digit describes the form or method of payment. The 
meaning of the third digit gives a more detailed description of the event. The fourth digit 
provides information about the tax status of the distribution. This work studies regular cash 
dividend frequency changes, thus, we only select firms with the first digit equals to 1, which 
represent the ordinary dividend; and the second digit equals to 2, 3 or 4 (referring to cash 
dividends in USD dollar). This step ensures only regular cash dividend payments in USD are 
selected. In terms of the value of the third digit that contains information about dividend 
frequency, we pay attention to 2, 3, 4 and 5, which representing monthly, quarterly, semi-annual 
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and annual dividend payment respectively. Thus, we further exclude observations that are equal 
to 0, 1, 6, 7, 8 and 9, which respectively refer to unknown, unspecified, year-end or final, extra or 
special, interim and non-recurring dividend frequency. This sample selection criteria result in a 
sample of 179,513 observations including 6,735 different firms in total.  
This study focusses on firm events, as non-firms distribute dividends that they received from 
investing in other dividend paying companies, thus might represent different information about 
company’s prospects and attract different clienteles. As mentioned in the literature and 
hypothesis that mangers are using dividends to signal firm performance, this argument doesn’t 
apply to funds and thus they should be removed to fit our sample to prior arguments. We initially 
identify the non-real firms from those observations with missing gvkey variable in Compustat 
datafile because theoretically we are unable to find information on specific “non-companies” 
from Compustat database. Precisely, the kinds of firms that are listed in Compustat are: 
companies with an equity security included in the S&P 500, S&P 400, S&P 600, S&P/TSX 
Composite, or Russell 3000 indices; companies with an equity security actively trading on the 
NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, TSX, or NYSE/Arca exchanges. After removing the identified non-
firms, the total number of firms in my sample went down from 6,735 to 5,199 with 151,576 
observations.  
We start to pick the changing firms by comparing the third digit of distribution code. Initially, we 
assume that the announcement date of frequency change is the dividend declaration date 
corresponding to the change of distribution code. Through this process, we obtain our original 
target sample with 703 observations in 543 firms with assumed event date.  
However, using the gvkey to remove non-firms is not a precise process thus we need to manually 
double check the remaining cases. We screen the non-firm one more time by manually 
identifying the company name ending with 'FUND', 'TRUST', 'REIT(s), ETF', etc., then double 
check with company description variable.5 After the application of this manual filtering, our real 
changing sample consist of 280 firms with 373 announcement observations.  
 
5 The remaining non-firms mainly exist in the division of “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate” with the SIC code 
ranging from 6000 to 6799. More specifically, in “Holding and Other Investment Office” industry with two-digit 
SIC code equal to “67”, such as 6722, 6726, 6730, 6733, 6792, 6798, 6799, etc.  
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To further clean the sample to only keep firms which are continuously paying cash dividends 
before a frequency change announcement, in a final step each dividend-frequency event was 
checked manually as follows: 1) We verify the validity of the event by comparing the third digit 
distribution code before and after the change with the firm’s actual distribution history to check 
whether the firm is paying dividends with the same frequency represented by the distribution 
code, which helps to detect the coding mistakes and decide the correct event date accordingly. 
Notice, we consider 0 (unknown) and 1 (unspecified) as third digit as candidates for data 
correction. Because we recognized that there might be some incomplete information included in 
the distribution code (e.g. “1” could actually be regular dividend payment such as monthly or 
quarterly and so on). 2) We make sure all firms in our sample have been paying dividends 
regularly one year before the event and continued to do so after the event. 225 events are 
removed during above two steps which do not comply with the requirement and the total number 
of frequency change announcements is scaled down to 148 occurrences in 133 firms. 3) We 
confirm with Factiva manually whether the real announcement date of frequency change is 
indeed the date where the company declares to pay a new type of dividend. We find that some 
firms declare to change their payout frequency prior to the next dividend announcement date 
especially among the frequency decreasing firms. Through strictly inspecting and capturing 
actual event date, we are confident that we get a clean dataset. There are 48 observations are 
dropped since the exact announcement dates could not be confirmed in Factiva. The final 
confirmed sample has 92 firms with 100 frequency changes. We keep the extended sample 
including both 100 confirmed sample and 48 unconfirmed sample as robustness database. 
 
3.3 Sample Description 
Based on the third digit of distribution code, we can classify the 100 confirmed sample into two 
general categories: firms changing from high to low frequency and firms changing from low to 
high frequency. We provide an overview on headquarters of sample firms in Table I. A 
significant proportion of frequency changes concentrate in America, especially for frequency 
increases.  
We are using SIC code to identify industry and provide an industry division description of the 
sample firms in Table II. We observe that almost half frequency changes happened in “Finance, 
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Insurance and Real Estate” industry. Specifically, to assess possible seasonality issues, the 2-
digit sic codes are summarized in Appendix A for further information. Only one observation of 
frequency change from quarterly to semi-annual is within seasonal industry. Appendix B 
provides the same industry classification for the extended sample. The main difference could be 
found in extended sample is that a quarter of frequency increase companies locate in 
manufacturing division.  
Figure I provides an overview of the year’s frequency changes are observed. We can clearly see 
the frequency change trend among our entire sample during the time period from 1970 to 2019. 
The peak period for frequency change in our study appear from 2008 till present also together 
with an increasing number of frequency change related to monthly dividends. During this peak 
time, majority of target firms announce their dividend will be paid more frequently while few 
firms announce to pay dividends with lower frequency. In the manual check for high to low 
frequency change, it is observed to be often connected to earning declines. Because of the 
specific emphasis on monthly dividends, frequency increase and decrease categories can be 
further broken into monthly involved frequency change subsample: frequency increase to 
monthly and frequency decrease from monthly to low. The first firm change to pay monthly 
dividend was observed in 2003. Until in 2008, monthly dividends became an emerging type of 
dividend distribution applied by a group of companies. In the meanwhile, some firms transit 
from monthly payment to lower frequency. Through the whole time period, the number of firms 
who announce to increase their dividend payment frequency are obviously greater than the 
number of firms that lower their dividend payment frequency. 
− Please insert Table I and II and Figure I about here – 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Univariate Event Study 
According to signaling hypothesis, we hypothesize that the market perceives the frequency 
increase as positive information and the frequency decline as negative signals conversely 
concerning firm’s future perspective. On the other hand, the investor preference predicts that 
investor derive higher utility when they are given more frequent payments and reflect this 
preference in a higher share price. Closely parallel the bird-in-the-hand theory that investors 
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prefer higher frequency because of the reduced uncertainty about future gains. Hence, our study 
starts with hypothesis that the market will positively react to the frequency increasing 
announcements, while adversely response to the announcements of frequency decline.  
To capture the market reactions to changes in frequency of dividend payment, we have employed 
a standard event study methodology with a sample of firms experiencing the changes of dividend 
payment frequency. In semi-efficient markets we expect new information to be immediately 
reflected in the stock price. Hence, the unanticipated market reactions arsing from the declaration 
of changing dividend payment frequency can be translated in the stock illustrating an abnormal 
return, which can be directly measured by the difference between realized return and the 
estimated drift. Experiencing the prior data filtering process, we are able to identify 100 
announcements of dividend frequency changes in total, including 82 frequency increase and 18 
frequency decrease. In order to examine market reactions to different types of frequency 
changes, we implement the event study on frequency increasing and decreasing sample 
separately.  
For each announcement we compute the announcement effects as the excess of the actual stock 
return over the benchmark "expected return". Considering that information from event can be 
leaked before the actual announcement and investors may not immediately react to the event, 
hence, for each announcement we use event period consist of a total of 41 days, 31 days, 26 
days, 21 days, 16 days, 11 days and 5 days respectively. Let the announcement of dividend 
payment frequency change as day 0, then we measure the daily abnormal returns over 10 kinds 
of event windows: day -20 through +20, day -20 through +10,  day -20 through +5, day -10 
through +20, day -10 through +10, day -10 through +5, day -5 through +20, day -5 through +10, 
day -5 through +5 and day -1 through +3 relative to the announcements. We then use a 150-days 
estimation period with minimum 120 days of non-missing returns included and a 15-day gap 
between the end of the estimation period and the beginning of the event window to calibrate our 
market model. The time period with [-20;+20] as event window can be presented graphically in 
Figure II.  
− Please insert Figure II about here – 
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We are using Fama French model to compute the expected returns. Model parameters were 
estimated from daily realized returns over the estimation period which are subsequently used to 
calculate the expected return during event period.6 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑓 + α+ 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                         (1)  
Let 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 designate the observed return at day t for each sample security i, 𝑅𝑚 as the value-weight 
market index in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets (from CRSP), 𝑅𝑓 is the one-month 
Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates) as proxy for the risk-free return, with S𝑀𝐵 as size 
premium, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 as value premium, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 as an error term at time t. The parameters α, 𝛽1, 𝛽2 
and 𝛽3 represent the linear structure of the model obtained in the estimation window.  
According to the assumption inherent in the Fama French model, the error term is unrelated to 
the overall market return with the expected value equal to zero. Equation (2) outlines the 
calculation of expected return unconditional on the event but conditional on the Fama French 
factors occurred during event period.  
     R𝑖
𝑒 = 𝑅𝑓 + α + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿                         (2) 
The security i’s event date abnormal return can be estimated using MacKinlay (1997)’s method 
by simply subtracting the estimated event date return (R𝑖,0
𝑒 ) from the observed event date return 
(𝑅𝑖,0): 
                                                              𝐴𝑅𝑖,0 = 𝑅𝑖,0 − R𝑖,0
𝑒                                                     (3) 
As we are considering an event period longer than one day, once we obtain the individual daily 
abnormal return, the next step is to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns during the period 
of event. We continue to follow the procedures described by MacKinlay (1997), we cumulate the 
daily abnormal returns over 𝑇2 − 𝑇1 event window length starting at time 𝑇1 + 1 through time 𝑇2 
in Equation (4) to identify the overall stock price effects.  
                                                        𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1+1
                                                     (4) 
 
6 We also use Market model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑓 + α + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑅𝑚 −𝑅𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  and Carhart model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑓 + α + 𝛽1 ∗
(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑈𝑀𝐷+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 to calculate the normal return, where 𝑈𝑀𝐷 represents the 
momentum factor (premium on winners minus losers). 
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The average abnormal return as well as the cumulative abnormal return over a several days 
period window without additional information entering the market is expected to be zero. As we 
are studying a combination of multiple security-event, we aggregate the individual cumulative 
abnormal return corresponding to event windows in order to test the cross-sectional event effect 
by the cumulative average abnormal returns (Schimmer, 2012).  





𝑖=1                                                    (5) 
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
By looking through our event study distribution data, majority of changes in payout frequency 
are announced jointly with a contemporaneous increase or decrease in total dividend amount, 
which might result in significant effect on the stock return behavior. We predict in Hypothesis 
1(a) that the favorable market reactions to frequency increase will be greater if the firm increases 
dividend payment amount at the same time. Thus, it is essential to control for the influence of the 
changes in overall dividend payment when we are testing the correlation between frequency 
change and announcement period abnormal returns. Moreover, there may be other firm-level 
characteristics that might affect the firm stock performance during the announcement period. In 
the following step we further analyse what fraction of the abnormal stock return effects can be 
explained by the firm event of frequency change, and what fraction can be explained by other 
firm related factors. Following the previous empirical research by Ferris et al. (2010), we 
conduct a multivariate analysis with a number of firm specific characteristics selected as control 
variables. By regressing the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in various event windows on 
the occurrence of frequency change with the control of other influencing factors, we are able to 
correctly measure the event period cumulative abnormal returns related to the frequency change 
and get an approximation on what may drive investor sentiment. 
We use the CARs for all firms, and then estimate the following regression: 
 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = α + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (6)                                                                                                              
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is calculated in Equation (4) for all firms for the event windows defined in Section 
4.1; 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 represents the dividend payment frequency change; 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦𝑖 is a dummy 
20 
 
variable created to estimate the specific value of monthly dividends; 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 is the dividend 
change generated at the same time as the frequency change; and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of company firm-
level control variables (Firm size, Book-to-Market, Return on asset, Stock return volatility, and 
Free cash return on assets). 
 
4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the CAR for the Fama French model, as calculated 
in Equation (4). We are using [-5;+5] and [-10;+10] as a symmetrical interval, which are 
frequently cited in previous studies (Al-Yahyaee et al., 2011; Dasilas and Leventis, 2011; Anjali 
and Raju, 2017). Additionally, we also apply for two asymmetric event windows with 20 days 
subsequent to the announcement date: [-5;+20] and [-10;+20] where the information is fully 
processed by the market. 
 
4.2.2 Dividend Change Related Variables 
To distinguish the effects of frequency change from other dividend change related factors and to 
explicitly research the value of monthly dividends for stock investors, we control for possible 
effects from changes in the total amount distributed in cash dividends to the investor as follows: 
Dividend payment frequency change (FreqChange). We define the frequency change as the 
change in the total number of times a firm pays dividend in one year. For example, if the firm 
change from quarterly to monthly dividend payment, we assume the frequency change equal to 8 
(12-4).  
Monthly dividend (Monthly). A dummy variable aiming at frequency increasing group with 
values of 1 if the firms increase their dividend payment frequency from low to monthly and 0 if 
otherwise. Relying on the clientele effect, the market reactions could be greater to frequency 
increase firms who have changed to pay monthly dividend than those who have not. Thus, we 
expect a positive sign on the coefficient. 
Total annual dividend payment change (DivChange). The implied change in total dividend 
payment amount is measured as change rate of total annual dividend amount (new total annual 
dividend minus the old total annual dividend divided by the old total annual dividend) relative to 
the market capitalization (the product of the market trading price and number of shares 
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outstanding as obtained from CRSP). The total annual dividend amount is calculated as the 
product of annual dividend per share and the outstanding shares on corresponding ex-dividend 
date.7 Investors are always pursuing a high-level dividend payment. Therefore, we expect a 
positive coefficient. 
 
4.2.3 Control Variables  
Firm size. In empirical corporate finance, size of the firm is commonly used as an important, 
fundamental firm characteristic because it is shown to affect firm performance (Fama and French 
(1992)). It is argued that size increases the possibility that a firm would achieve economies of 
scale and market power which could enhance its profits and distribute more dividends. On the 
other hand, larger firms are monitored by institutional investors and financial analyst more 
frequently which might push firms to adopt a higher dividend payout so that reduce the level of 
information asymmetry. Contrarily, Farinha (2003) find a negative correlation between firm size 
and dividends, which could be explained by the higher cash demand for investment in large 
firms. These arguments, in turn, suggest the existence of size difference amongst the large and 
small firms affects their dividend policy and consequently valuations for firms. As for the 
determinants of firm size, scholars employ varying proxies of firm size such as total assets, total 
sales, and market capitalization. This study approximates the firm size by the natural logarithm 
of a firm’s market capitalization five trading days prior to the event date (in lien with e.g. Nayak 
and Prabhala (2001)). The market capitalization is the product of the market trading price and 
number of shares outstanding as obtained from CRSP.  
Book-to-Market. The ratio of a firm’s book value of equity to its market value of equity, which 
are obtained from a combination of Compustat and CRSP sources as proxy for value effect. It is 
popularly used as a return predictor that is expected to alter the variability of firm’s prospective 
financial performance. Normally, a company’s share value will be greater than its book value 
because the share price takes into account of how investors estimate about the future profitability 
 
7 For example, a firm announce to increase its dividend payment frequency from quarterly to monthly and declare its 
first monthly dividend with cash amount equal to $0.16 per share on December 3, 2013. There are 58618 shares on 
its corresponding ex-dividend date (January 9, 2014). The previous last quarterly dividend payment was announced 
on October 25, 2013 with dividend cash amount equal to 0.49 per share. There are 58566 shares on its 
corresponding ex-dividend date (Novmber 5, 2013). Then we calculate the new total annual dividend amount as 
0.16*12*58618 and the old total annual dividend as 0.49*4*58566. 
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of the company – how well it uses its assets – into consideration. As a result, high book-to-
market stocks are referred as value stock while low book-to-market ratio stocks are referred as 
growth stock. A low book-to-market ratio indicates that investors are willing to pay a premium 
for firm’s future potential growth, which implies the firm has higher growth opportunities. It is 
observed that the high book-to-market stocks earn a higher excess return relative to stocks with 
low book-to-market ratios (Fama and French, 1992). High growth firms are found to have lower 
dividend yields (Gaver, J. and Gaver, K., 1993; La porta et al., 2000). Thus, the less abnormal 
returns in securities with low book-to-market ratios are likely attributed to less dividend yields. 
Return on assets (ROA). This variable represents the firm’s profitability calculated using net 
income divided by total assets. The level of profitability might reduce the firm’s propensity to 
pay dividends if we pay attention to the cash constraint a firm might face. Since high profitability 
comes from higher investment. Especially for growth firms, they may drain out of cash for 
positive NPV projects instead of paying dividends.  
Return volatility. As a proxy for uncertainty of stock return behavior, which might lead to the 
different magnitude of CARs during event period, it is computed as the standard deviation of 
stock holding period returns over the one year prior to the announcement date of dividend 
payment frequency change.  
Free cash return on assets (Free Cash). Since cash dividends payments are generally paid from 
firm’s permanent cash flow, the level of permanent cash flow determines not only the firm’s 
ability to pay dividend, but also the dividend frequency the firm elect to pay (Ferris et al. 
(2010)). We are using the free cash return on assets to represent the level of permanent cash 
flow, which is estimated by earnings before interest (EBIDTA) minus the capital expenditure 
divided by the total assets from last available fiscal year, in order to control for the possible 
influence on dividend policy.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 The Market Reactions to Changes of Dividend Payment Frequency 
The first part of this section illustrates the univariate event study results. As noted in 
methodology, the unexpected market reactions triggered by the frequency changes can be 
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interpreted as abnormal returns during disclosure period. By defining the announcement date as 
day 0, various CAARs for different event windows are calculated to identify the overall market 
reactions. The null hypothesis to be tested is that the CAARs will be equal to zero. 100 
announcements in 1970-2019 period were investigated during data collection process. Notably, 
we are missing 4 events by using event study methodology due to less than 120 returns data 
available over estimation period. Hence, the univariate event study is completed based on 96 
announcements of frequency change including 78 frequency increase and 18 frequency decline. 
Figure III and Figure IV visualize the market reactions to the frequency increase and frequency 
decrease respectively by CARs calculated by Fama French model during the [-20;+20] event 
window. We expect over reactions from investors to the disclosure of frequency change, there by 
resulting in positive stock price movement in frequency increasing firms and negative stock price 
behavior in frequency declining firms. Consistently, the CARs in firms that elect to increase 
dividend payment frequency experienced a gradual upward trend following the announcement 
date. While a downward tendency occurred in CARs among frequency decrease firms since they 
declared to pay less frequent dividends. Similar CARs trend in extended sample can be found in 
Appendix C. 
− Please insert Figure III and IV about here – 
The estimates of CAARs using the Fama-French three factor model over various event windows 
are presented in Table III for the sample of 78 events of frequency from low to high (Panel 1) as 
well as for 18 events of frequency from high to low (Panel 2). Statistical inferences for the 
different event-windows CAARs are drawn using Patell’s Z (see Patell (1976)) and the 
“standardized cross-sectional test (SCS)” of Boehmer et al. (1991). The SCS test is more reliable 
as it allows for the event-induced variance.  
In Panel 1 of Table III we observe that changes in dividend payment frequency among 
frequency-increasing sample firms produce positive cumulative average abnormal returns for all 
chosen event windows. However, not all results are statistically significantly different from zero. 
We extend the event window before the event to control for possible information leakage which 
should be measured after the event date. Thus, a shorter event window may be more beneficial 
since it reduces volatility which is induced by the information leakage. Considering the event 
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windows only 5-day after the announcement date, the narrowest event window [-5;+5] which is 
widely implemented in previous event studies (Dasilas and Leventis, 2011; Ferris et al., 2010; 
Ozo and Arun, 2017) shows that the CAAR is less than one percent and statistically 
insignificant. Results are similar for the event windows that proceed the announcement date 10 
or 20 days. It suggests that the information might be leaked less than five days before the official 
announcements but not much. In line with the information asymmetry arguments, majority of 
investors are less aware of the firm’s internal information about the frequency change until the 
firm inform to the public. Specially, a significant CAAR appear in [-10;+20] event window, 
combined with the bump at day -10 in Figure III, there might be some information got into the 
market from coinciding other events. Looking at 5 days prior to announcement day, the CAARs 
become statistically significant different from zero as the number of days after the event date, to 
be considered in the event window, is increased. Relying on the less significant and lower CAAR 
for [-5;+5] event window, it looks like the information is not yet fully incorporated after 5 days. 
The largest CAAR equal to 2.33% at the five percent significance level exists in a 26-day event 
window from 5-days prior to the event to 20-days thereafter. Contrary to our expectations in 
semi-efficient markets that information should be incorporated into stock prices right after the 
announcement, however it seems like it takes 20 days. As recommended in papers of Anjali and 
Raju (2017) and Yaseen and Trifan (2019), we use two additional symmetric event windows 
which respectively contain 21 days and 41 days and obtain relatively higher CAAR (2.16%) in 
the wider interval but remain insignificant. We also add [-1;+3] window to see the short-term 
effect and get significant CAAR equal to1.44%. Combined with a CAAR jump within the first 
five days seen from Figure III, we conclude that the market reacts immediately to frequency 
increase information once it is disclosed.  
Panel 2 display the CAARs pertaining to the announcements of frequency decrease. As we 
expected, we receive negative excessive returns among the entire sample regardless of which 
event window is applied. Similar as the results of frequency increase sample, the market reaction 
is more significant and distinctive in absolute term if we shorten the pre-announcement period 
and prolong the event window after the announcement date. For instance, the three event 
windows starting from day -5 relative to event date generate uniformly significant CAARs. 
Again, we obtain the most significant CAARs with strongest absolute value (-6.98%) during [-
5;+20] event window. This confirms our comments that the market does not absorb the 
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information of frequency change efficiently. The CAAR in short-term effect period is only -
0.99% which is statistically insignificant, indicating that the market does not react to frequency 
decrease as soon as it is announced.  
This study tests for the significance of CAARs difference between increases and decreases in 
cash dividend payment frequency as shown in the last column. The results find, in exception of 
CAARs in [-20;+10], [-20;+5] and [-10;+5] event period, the CAARs in two separate sample are 
significantly different from each other with a roughly 6% gap in average. This provides evidence 
on the information content of dividend payment frequency changes that investors regard 
frequency change announcements as valuable information about firm’s future prospects. In 
addition, frequency decrease related CAARs are marginally larger in magnitude compared with 
the frequency increase findings in Panel 1. This implies that the market reacts optimistically 
toward frequency increase; however, the market is more pessimistic in response to the 
announcements of frequency decreases. Thus, giving reasons why firms are reluctant to switch to 
lower payout frequency if possible.8  
− Please insert Table III about here – 
Overall, the optimal window should look at, most likely one with short number of days before 
event date and longer period thereafter to account for information leakage. Even though CAARs 
of -20 to +10 days, -20 to +5 days, -10 to +10 days and -10 to +5 days appear to be relatively 
weakly due to the lack of significance, the correctly predicted positive sign for the 
announcements of dividend frequency increases and negative CAARs surrounding the disclosure 
of frequency decline provide compelling evidence to support our Hypothesis 1. With respect to 
investor preference, the positive share price reactions during frequency increase period reveal the 
market preference for higher payout frequency and vice versa. This preference could be 
interpreted by the “bird-in-the-hand” hypothesis that investors obtain higher degree of certainty 
about future cash flow and stock investment. In the meanwhile, in agreement with the usefulness 
of signaling hypothesis, the favorable (unfavorable) market response to the announcement of 
frequency increase (decrease) makes dividend payment frequency change informative about the 
company’s future prospects and cash flow. The investors may perceive the firm’s decision to 
 
8 We also calculated the CAARs using expected market return based on Market model and Carhart model 
as robustness check and results remain stable. 
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increase their dividend payment frequency as positive managerial expectations about firm’s 
future performance while interpret the announcements of frequency decline as bad news in 
regard to firm’s future performance.  
Moreover, additional robustness tests are performed using the extended sample including 100 
confirmed announcements and 48 unconfirmed announcements (5 observations are dropped due 
to insufficient return data during estimation period). Appendix D contains the results of 
univariate analysis of CAARs. Panel 1 of Appendix D shows higher CAARs which are 
statistically significant at the 1% or 5 % level for all chosen event windows, indicating stronger 
market reactions to frequency increases. CAARs in Panel 2 remain stable with relatively higher 
significance. This confirms our findings that the market treats significantly positively to 
frequency increase announcements and vice versa.  
Notice, the presented analysis is based on the complete sample of frequency changes. However, 
we observe that dividend frequency changes often coincide with other changes in dividend 
payout policy such as increases or decreases in annual cash dividend payments. The next 
sections discuss what may be the may driver for the observed stock market reactions.  
 
5.2 Simultaneous Dividend Payment Change Effect 
If the frequency change announcements coincide with a change in total cash amount payed in 
annual dividends, the market reactions reflected in the CAARs during the announcement period 
might be dominated by overall dividend payments change rather than a frequency change. Since 
we cannot really distinguish both effects and can only get a first idea by splitting the sample. To 
control for the potential effect resulting from a change in dividend payment amount, we further 
break down the full sample of frequency increase and frequency decrease into three different 
sub-sample based on the total annual dividend change. In panel 1, the full sample of frequency 
increase (low to high) is divided into three sub-samples where 1) dividend amount is increased at 
the same time, 2) divided amount is decreased at the same time and 3) dividend amount remains 
unchanged. Similarly, the full sample of frequency decrease (high to low) is separated into three 
sub-samples accordingly. Panel 1 and Panel 2 of Table IV report the respective CAARs.  
Panel 1 of Table IV shows, the frequency increases accompanied with an increase in dividend 
payment result in larger CAARs as compared to the results of full sample displayed in Table III, 
27 
 
which are also significant at the 10% level for most event windows. Conversely, the sub-sample 
of dividend decrease in Panel 1 show us negative CAARs although none are statistically 
significant at the 10% level except for the [-1;+3] event window with CAAR of -1.57%, which 
represents the immediate market reactions to dividend amount decrease together with an increase 
in payment frequency. This is an indication that the effect of reduction in dividend payment is 
stronger than the frequency increase. In terms of the observations with no change in dividend 
amount, most reported CAARs are positive, with the exception for the event windows [-5;+20], 
[-20;+5] and [-20;+20] which are slightly negative. However, none of the CAARs are 
statistically significant at the usual levels even though the event windows [-10;+10] and [-5;+10] 
report larger CAARs as compared to the sub-sample where dividend increases coincide with 
increases in payment frequency. Overall, the results are not conclusive due to the low number of 
observations.   
Similarly, the results reported in the “dividend increase” section of Panel 2, are affected by the 
low sample size. Overall, all observed CAARs are negative but not statistically significant from 
zero for both sub-samples: Dividends amount increase and no change in amount of dividend 
payment together with frequency changes. We find statistically significant negative CAARs for 
most event windows when dividend amount decreases together with a decrease in payment 
frequency. Thus, the market adversely reacts to dividend decrease in a significantly higher 
magnitude, indicating that the dividend payment reduction strengthens the pessimistic market 
reactions to frequency reduction.  
Therefore, the findings in Panel 1 and 2 prove that given the total number of times a firm pay 
dividends, a rise in overall dividend payments enhance the positive value effect from frequency 
increase. Meanwhile, a drop in total amount of dividends decrease the CAARs during 
announcement period. The empirical results using extended sample in Appendix E strengthen 
our results, illustrating stronger positive CARs among frequency increase announcements 
coincided with dividend increases and negative CARs in larger magnitude if firms cut dividends 
at the same time with frequency decreases. However, since it is only a univariate test with 
limited number of observations, we cannot fully grasp the complete effect. We shed further light 
on the cumulative abnormal returns related to the frequency change and dividend amount 
variations separately in the multivariate analysis.  
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− Please insert Table IV about here – 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis 
The results in preceding section reveal that the dividend change accompanied with frequency 
conversion and adjustment to the overall payout exert observable influence on firm’s stock price 
and thus market valuations. In fact, in addition to the overall dividend change, there exists a set 
of firm specific characteristics that might be able to account for the announcement period 
significant cumulative average abnormal returns. To ascertain whether the relation between 
dividend policy change and excess stock returns also persists in competition with other 
influencing variables, we further implement a multivariate analysis by regressing event period 
cumulative abnormal returns on dividend change related variables with the control of firm-level 
factors.  
We design a multivariate cross-sectional model using the cumulative abnormal returns obtained 
over two popular event windows [-5;+5], [-10;+10] as dependent variable. In addition, CARs 
within [-5;+20] and [-10;20] event windows are used as well since the univariate tests show that 
20 days the market may take until the information is fully processed. This study uses three 
explanatory variables to research the effects of dividend policy change on stock price reaction: 1) 
dividend payment frequency change (FreqChange), referring to the changes in total number of 
time that firms distribute dividends annually; 2) monthly dividend (Monthly) is created aims at 
frequency increasing sample who elect to pay monthly dividends. Relying on the clientele effect, 
firms converting to pay monthly dividends may influence the portfolio choices of investors with 
different clientele structure looking for regular income. In other words, market reactions to the 
disclosures of monthly dividend distribution are expected to be differently from other frequency 
change announcements; 3) Total annual dividend payment change (DivChange) implies the 
change rate of total annual dividend payment amount relative to the market capitalization. This 
study further controls for relevant firm specific factors that might be responsible for the 
generation of the announcements period abnormal return introduced as control variables in 
Section 4.2.3. None of the predictors VIF value exceeds 10 with the mean value less than 2, 
which ensures no multicollinearity problem exists in a multivariate context. Finally, this research 




The multivariate estimations using industry fixed effects are shown in Table V. After explicitly 
controlling for the other influence factors, the correlation between announcements of frequency 
change and CAARs remain statistically significant and positive for all four event windows. The 
robustness check using extended sample comes to the same conclusion in Appendix F. This is in 
line with Ferris et al.’s (2010) findings and provides confirmatory evidence on this study’s first 
hypothesis that market react favorably to frequency from low to high and vice versa. As 
suggested by Ferris et al. (2010), this could be explained by investor preference theory that 
investors prefer more frequent dividend payments, which are reflected in higher valuations of the 
company’s security. Combined with the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis, rational investors are in 
favor of frequent dividend payment as they pursue reduced uncertainty about future cash flow 
and investment decision. From the standpoint of signaling hypothesis, the significant positive 
coefficient on the frequency change suggest the informativeness of the frequency change 
announcement. Investors probably value the firm’s decision to change its payout frequency as 
worthy information about firm’s future prospects, thus react on the basis of information revealed. 
As such, the rise in dividend payment frequency will be considered as good news and stimulate 
positive abnormal returns generated nearing announcement period. Consistent with findings in 
Section 5.1, the coefficient on frequency change become greater and more statistically significant 
as we prolong the post-announcement period, indicating that the investors take longer time to 
absorb the information contained in frequency change announcements. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1(a) and work of Ferris et al. (2010), the annual dividend change is 
positively related to the cumulative abnormal returns. However, the test statistics suggest the 
correlation is not significant. This results probably tell us that the frequency change 
announcements have stronger short-term effect on CAARs than the concurrent dividend payout 
amount changes. Based on the univariate results, we are however of the view that an increase in 
overall dividend amount enhance the generation of abnormal returns while a decrease in overall 
dividend adversely affect the announcement period CAARs. We have to admit that there is only 
a limited number of observations where frequency increases (decreases) coincided with dividend 
amount decreases (increases). The robustness results in Appendix F using a larger but 
unconfirmed sample show that the annual dividend amount change becomes significant for the [-
5;+5] window which hints it may a problem with sample size. In contrast to Hypothesis 2, 
CAARs in [-5;+5] and[-5;+20] event windows are not significantly related to the monthly 
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dummy variable, suggesting that investors value the frequency increase to monthly equally as 
other types of frequency change and there are no new clienteles will be attracted by monthly 
dividends. Unexpectedly, there is significant negative sign on monthly coefficient during [-
10;+20] event window, not but close to significant negative sign during [-10;+10] event window, 
which provide no evidence for the prediction that new clienteles are attracted by monthly 
dividends which form new clientele structure and lead to higher valuations of monthly dividend 
payer. This could be linked to taxation reason that higher rates taxed at frequent dividends reduce 
the after-tax return thus weaken the demand for monthly dividends. Moreover, the main 
investors in firms who change to pay monthly dividends are probably reinvesting investment 
funds or institutional investors with no high payout preference.  
Besides, we observe that the coefficient for the free cash return on assets is statistically 
significant and positive in all multivariate models. In this paper, we view this variable as the 
level of permanent cash flow where the dividends are generally paid from. As argued by Ferris et 
al. (2010) that the level of permanent cash flow determines not only the firm’s ability to pay 
dividend, but also the dividend frequency the firm elect to pay. Therefore, the result may suggest 
that the high-level permanent cash flow increases the chance for firms to pay more dividends 
with higher frequency, in turn, to create excessive stock returns. The extended sample results 
presented in the Appendix F demonstrate that the Free Cash remain positive but are only 
significant for the [-5;+5] event window. Instead the Book-to-Market becomes significant in [-
5;+20], [-10;+10] and [-10;+20] and close to significant in the shortest [-5;+5] event window. 
This is in agreement with the findings of Fama and French (1992) that value firms tend to earn a 
higher excess return relative to growth firms which could be due to the lower dividend yields in 
high growth firms. At the same time, The proxy for profitability (ROA) has a negative and 
significant coefficient in [-5;+5] event window although no significance can be found for the 
extended sample. This is in agreement with our prior comments that higher profitability means 
higher investment thus reduce the firm’s propensity to pay dividends due to cash constraint. 
Therefore, the adversely market reactions might be attributed to less dividend distribution.  




The paper considers only cash dividends and investigates the significance of dividend payment 
frequency change by examining a sample of firms declaring to change their dividend payment 
frequency in U.S. listings. As expected under hypothesis, the initial univariate analysis report 
significant cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of a change in 
dividend payment frequency. But the subsequent classified analysis reveals that the 
announcement period CAARs vary greatly with the simultaneous changes in dividend payment 
amount. As further evidence of the market reactions related to announcements of frequency 
change, the multivariate results demonstrate that the positive relationship between 
announcements of dividend payment frequency change and market value remain significantly 
positive after controlling for other firm specific factors. This implies that dividend policy 
regarding to the payout frequency change does have an impact on the share price of the firm.  
The positive (negative) market reactions to frequency change from low to high (from high to 
low) can be interpreted as dividend signaling effect that investors perceive the firm’s choice of 
frequency change as managerial expectations about firm’s future performance. Since dividends 
are generally paid from future earnings. It is natural that managers are more likely to pay 
dividend frequently when they have positive expectations about firm’s continuously growth. 
Additionally, firm value is an increasing function of the investor preference of the firm. The 
implications of the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis predict that the stockholders prefer to invest in 
stocks with more frequent dividend distributions as the more often the dividends are paid, the 
lower uncertainty about future cash payments and their investment decisions. From a business 
perspective, managers are expected to convert to pay more frequent dividends with a view to 
enhancing value. This finding probably explains the large concentration of frequency increase in 
our sample. The annual dividend change is found to be positively associated with event period 
CARs, which is consistent with our initial hypothesis that increases in overall dividend improve 
the market valuations of firms. While the positive correlation is unpersuasive due to the lack of 
significance. We find no support that the investors value the firms who elect to pay monthly 
dividends higher than other types of frequency change our expectations. Instead, the frequency 
change to monthly negatively affects the announcement period CARs. This is probably linked to 
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taxation reason or that main investors are reinvesting investment funds or institutional investors 
with no high payout preference. 
While this analysis contributes to the literature on corporate dividend policy concerning 
frequency change, it has some limitations that could be addressed by further researchers. We 
suspect the limitations with regards to possible firm related variables which have been omitted 
and limited number of observations may lead to our insignificant results. Therefore, this study 
recommends that a similar study be undertaken on an expanded sample data with more firm 
characteristics as control variables. Moreover, since this paper focuses on short-term effect of 
dividend payment frequency changes, future researcher could further extent this study from a 
long-term perspective, thus examine whether firms perform as same as what investors expect 
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 Figure and Tables  
Figure I: Event Distribution 
This table report the distribution of entire and sub-sample events. The entire sample covers all confirmed events (100) from 1970 until 2019, 
which are distributed into 82 low-to-high frequency change events occurred in 78 firms and 18 high-to-low frequency change events occurred in 
18 firms. The sub-sample is reduced for all events relating to monthly dividend payment and is distributed into 14 low-to-monthly events occurred 
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Figure II: Timeline of Event Study 
The following graph illustrates the event study timeline with a 41-days event window [-20;+20]. 
 
Figure III: CARs Around the Disclosure of Frequency Increase  
Graphical illustration of the confident range of cumulative abnormal returns with 95% confidence limits from Day -20 through Day +20. There are 
78 confirmed events of dividend payment frequency from low to high in total with non-missing returns. 
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Figure IV: CARs Around the Disclosure of Frequency Decrease.  
Graphical illustration of the confident range of cumulative abnormal returns with 95% confidence 
limits from Day -20 through Day +20. There are 18 confirmed events of dividend payment 




Table I:  Headquarter Overview 












Canada 13 13% 8 10% 5 28%
United Kingdom 2 2% 0 0% 2 11%
Ireland 1 1% 1 1% 0 0%
Israel 2 2% 2 2% 0 0%
Panama 1 1% 1 1% 0 0%
United States of America 80 80% 69 84% 11 61%
South Africa 1 1% 1 1% 0 0%
Total 100 100% 82 100% 18 100%
Panel 1: Total Events Panel 2: Low to High Panel 3: High to Low 
40 
 
Table II:  Industry Classification 
This table summarizes the different industries of the confirmed sample that change their dividend payment frequency. The full sample of are 
divided into two groups: frequency change from low to high, and frequency change from high to low respectively. Each firm is classified to one of 










Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1 1% 0 0% 1 6%
Construction 2 2% 1 1% 1 6%
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 46 46% 39 48% 7 39%
Manufacturing 10 10% 9 11% 1 6%
Mining 18 18% 14 17% 4 22%
Nonclassifiable 5 5% 5 6% 0 0%
Services 10 10% 8 10% 2 11%
Transportation,Communications,Electric,Gas and Sanitary Service 6 6% 4 5% 2 11%
Wholesale Trade 2 2% 2 2% 0 0%
Total 100 100% 82 100% 18 100%
Panel 1: Total Events Panel 2: Low to High Panel 3: High to Low 
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Table III: CAARs Around the Announcement of Changes in Dividend Payment Frequency  
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal return (CAARs) around the announcement of changes in dividend payment frequency for 
various event windows in confirmed sample, followed by the test statistics including the “standardized cross-sectional test” of Boehmer et al. 
(1991) and the Patell’s Z (see Patell (1976)). We have 96 announcements of dividend payment frequency with minimum of 120 non-missing 
returns for estimation and separate them into two groups: frequency change from low to high and frequency change from high to low. Panel 1 
covers all frequency increasing events (n=78) occurred in 74 firms; and Panel 2 covers all frequency declining events (n=18) happened in 18 
firms. The last two columns report and statistical tests for differences between the CAARs of Panel 1 and Panel 2. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Moreover, we perform the same univariate analysis of CAARs using the 
extended sample in Appendix D.  
 
Event window CAAR SCS test Patell Z Rank test No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z Rank test No. Events Mean t-Test
[-20;+20] 2.16% 1.49 1.34 1.37 78 -6.40% -1.55 -2.08** -1.68* 18 8.55% 1.66*
[-20;+10] 1.46% 1.16 1.15 1.1 78 -4.42% -1.19 -1.67* -1.47 18 5.87% 1.22
[-20;+5] 0.77% 0.57 0.51 0.77 78 -2.77% -0.93 -1.28 -1.64 18 3.54% 0.94
[-10;+20] 2.17% 1.83* 1.67* 1.45 78 -6.24% -2.02** -1.93* -1.41 18 8.42% 2.78***
[-10;+10] 1.55% 1.59 1.60 1.18 78 -4.04% -1.38 -1.50 -0.74 18 5.59% 1.66*
[-10;+5] 0.89% 1.05 0.92 0.8 78 -2.17% -1.18 -1.00 -0.69 18 3.06% 1.59
[-5;+20] 2.33% 2.02** 1.95* 1.6 78 -6.98% -2.46** -2.37** -1.64 18 9.30% 3.36***
[-5;+10] 1.63% 1.95* 1.87* 1.38 78 -4.82% -1.74* -2.06** -0.98 18 6.45% 2.12**
[-5;+5] 0.93% 1.32 1.19 0.99 78 -3.08% -1.60 -1.67* -0.98 18 4.01% 2.51**
[-1;+3] 1.44% 1.93* 2.22** 0.99 78 -0.99% -0.62 -0.45 -0.54 18 4.01% 2.51**
Test for DifferencePanel 1: Low to High Panel 2: High to Low
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Table IV: Dividend Change Related CAARs 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal return (CAARs) around the announcements of changes in dividend payment frequency for 
various event windows in confirmed sample, followed by the test statistics including the “standardized cross-sectional test” of Boehmer et al. 
(1991) and the Patell’s Z (see Patell (1976)). The 78 announcements of frequency increase are further separated into 60 dividend-increase, 13 
dividend-decrease and 5 no dividend change in Panel 1. The 18 confirmed announcements of frequency decrease are further separated into 6 
dividend-increase, 11 dividend-decrease and 1 no dividend change in Panel 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 











Event window CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events
[-20;+20] 3.16% 1.66* 1.53 60 -1.33% -0.19 -0.16 13 -0.85% 0.24 0.23 5
[-20;+10] 2.20% 1.43 1.48 60 -2.18% -0.75 -0.67 13 1.96% 0.68 0.51 5
[-20;+5] 1.34% 0.92 0.87 60 -1.52% -0.90 -0.69 13 -0.08% 0.21 0.12 5
[-10;+20] 2.77% 1.74* 1.58 60 -0.10% 0.32 0.28 13 0.93% 0.55 0.69 5
[-10;+10] 1.92% 1.60 1.64 60 -0.85% -0.27 -0.24 13 3.31% 0.94 1.03 5
[-10;+5] 1.13% 1.10 1.03 60 -0.24% -0.46 -0.30 13 0.95% 0.70 0.56 5
[-5;+20] 3.26% 2.39** 2.13** 60 -1.02% -0.17 -0.17 13 -0.12% 0.36 0.63 5
[-5;+10] 2.28% 2.40** 2.30** 60 -1.82% -0.78 -0.89 13 2.79% 0.72 1.16 5
[-5;+5] 1.42% 1.96** 1.68* 60 -1.30% -1.31 -1.15 13 0.78% 0.56 0.73 5
[-1;+3] 2.16% 3.00*** 3.11*** 60 -1.57% -2.48** -1.98** 13 0.66% 0.52 1.19 5
Panel 1: From Low to High























Event window CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events
[-20;+20] -0.39% 0.20 0.27 6 -9.43% -2.00** -2.70*** 11 -9.12% - -0.52 1
[-20;+10] -0.52% 0.20 0.32 6 -6.75% 1.73* -2.33** 11 -2.17% - -0.14 1
[-20;+5] -1.40% 0.03 0.06 6 -3.18% -1.22 -1.54 11 -6.53% - -0.46 1
[-10;+20] -2.48% -0.28 -0.27 6 -7.73% -2.07** -2.03** 11 -12.46% - -0.80 1
[-10;+10] -2.65% -0.31 -0.33 6 -4.70% -1.31 -1.55 11 -5.18% - -0.40 1
[-10;+5] -3.44% -0.64 -0.74 6 -0.87% -0.68 -0.50 11 -8.86% - -0.79 1
[-5;+20] -2.04% -0.31 -0.26 6 -10.13% -2.83*** -2.79*** 11 -1.94% - -0.13 1
[-5;+10] -2.19% -0.31 -0.31 6 -7.06% -1.95* -2.51** 11 4.06% - 0.36 1
[-5;+5] -3.02% -0.72 -0.80 6 -3.36% -1.39 -1.53 11 -0.32% - -0.03 1
[-1;+3] -0.99% -0.07 -0.11 6 -0.53% -0.29431 -0.3224 11 -6.08% - -0.94 1
Dividend Increase Dividend Decrease Dividend No change
Panel 2:  From High to Low
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Table V: Determinants of CARs 
This table reports the correlation between the announcements of frequency change and the event period cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in [-
5;+5], [-5;+20], [-10;+10] and [-10;+20] four event windows within confirmed sample. All models include industry fixed effects (11 singleton 
observations are dropped from the 96 total observations). The definitions of all variables can be found in Section 4.2.1 ~ 4.2.3. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variance inflation factors are also calculated as supplementary tests for multicollinearity issues. Same 
multivariate analysis of CARs using the extended sample is performed in Appendix F.  
CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-5;+20] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-10;+20]
Intercept -0.0041095 -0.0032295 -0.0167832 -0.041045
（-0.11） (-0.05) （-0.28） （-0.61）
FreqChange 0.0045477* 0.0119692*** 0.0103975** 0.0137406***
（1.81） (2.61) （2.55） （2.97）
Monthly -0.0277746 -0.0630059 -0.0819501 -0.1023943*
（-0.90） (-1.12) (-1.63) （-1.80）
DivChange 0.4726814 0.7063816 0.4339435 0.725415
（1.49） (1.22) (0.84) （1.24）
Firm Size -0.0009746 -0.0032522 -0.0003174 -0.0020891
（-0.24） (-0.43) (-0.05) （-0.27）
Book-to-Market -0.0000188 0.0104287 0.0211471 0.0364002
（-0.00） (0.36) (0.82) （1.25）
Return Volatility -0.0887807   -.3789283 -0.4238227 -0.1136323
（-0.12） (-0.27) (-0.34) （-0.08）
ROA -0.2810994** -0.2663116 -0.2738641 -0.1782165
(-2.17) (-1.12) (-1.30) （-0.75）
Free Cash 0.3296361*** 0.4223279** 0.3423607** 0.4043503**
(3.11) (2.18) (1.99) （2.07）
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 85 85 85 85
Max VIF 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45
Mean VIF 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95
Adj R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.16
F-Statistics 2.21 2.24 1.65 2.56
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Appendix A. 2-digit SIC Industry Classification 
This table summarizes the different industries of the confirmed sample that change their dividend 
payment frequency, including the frequency change from low to high and frequency change from high to 




10 Metal Mining 12 9 3
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 6 5 1
15 Construction - General Contractors & Operative Builders 2 1 1
18 N/A 1 0 1
20 Food and Kindred Products 2 1 1
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 1 1 0
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 1 1 0
36 Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment & Components 4 4 0
38 Measuring, Photographic, Medical, & Optical Goods, & Clocks 2 2 0
45 Transportation by Air 1 1 0
48 Communications 1 1 0
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 4 2 2
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 1 1 0
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 1 1 0
60 Depository Institutions 19 19 0
61 Nondepository Credit Institutions 1 1 0
62 Security & Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges & Services 7 5 2
63 Insurance Carriers 7 4 3
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 12 10 2
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 1 1 0
72 Personal Services 1 1 0
73 Business Services 3 3 0
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 2 0 2
80 Health Services 1 1 0
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, and Management Services 2 2 0
99 Nonclassifiable Establishments 5 5 0










Appendix B. Industry Classification (Extended Sample) 
This table summarizes the different industries of the extended sample that change their dividend payment frequency. The full sample of are 
divided into two groups: frequency change from low to high, and frequency change from high to low respectively. Each firm is classified to one of 














Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1 1% 0 0% 1 5%
Construction 5 3% 4 3% 1 5%
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 55 37% 46 37% 9 41%
Manufacturing 33 22% 31 25% 2 9%
Mining 18 12% 14 11% 4 18%
Nonclassifiable 6 4% 6 5% 0 0%
Retail Trade 3 2% 3 2% 0 0%
Services 16 11% 13 10% 3 14%
Transportation,Communications,Electric,Gas and Sanitary Service 7 5% 5 4% 2 9%
Wholesale Trade 4 3% 4 3% 0 0%
Total 148 100% 126 100% 22 100%
Panel 1: Total Events Panel 2: Low to High Panel 3: High to Low 
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Appendix C.  CARs Around the Disclosure of Frequency Changes 
(Extended Sample) 
The same graphical illustration as shown in Figure III and Figure IV using extended sample. There are 






Appendix D.  Univariate Analysis (Extended Sample)  
This table reports the same univariate analysis as shown in Table III using the extended sample including 143 announcements of dividend payment 
frequency with minimum of 120 non-missing returns for estimation and separate them into two groups: frequency change from low to high and 
frequency change from high to low. Panel 1 covers all frequency increasing events (n=121) occurred in 113 firms; and Panel 2 covers all 
frequency declining events (n=22) happened in 22 firms. The last two columns report and statistical tests for differences between the CAARs of 








Event window CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events Mean t-Test
[-20,+20] 2.85% 2.42** 2.58*** 121 -6.08% -1.89* -2.37** 22 8.93% 2.44**
[-20,+10] 3.11% 2.46** 2.94*** 121 -4.40% -1.53 -2.07** 22 7.51% 1.79*
[-20;+5] 3.07% 2.46** 2.88*** 121 -2.14% -1.13 -1.50 22 5.22% 1.83*
[-10,+20] 2.51% 2.67*** 2.86*** 121 -5.88% -2.39** -2.15** 22 8.39% 2.85***
[-10,+10] 2.81% 2.94*** 3.42*** 121 -3.98% -1.70* -1.82* 22 6.79% 2.58***
[-10;+5] 2.79% 3.20*** 3.49*** 121 -1.54% -1.27 -1.10 22 4.34% 2.17**
[-5;+20] 1.96% 2.38** 2.55** 121 -6.66% -2.84*** -2.58** 22 8.62% 3.21***
[-5;+10] 2.19% 2.70*** 3.14*** 121 -4.74% -2.00** -2.35** 22 6.94% 2.38**
[-5;+5] 2.14% 2.93*** 3.24*** 121 -2.36% -1.65* -1.70* 22 4.51% 2.67***
[-1;+3] 2.13% 3.21*** 4.51*** 121 0.00% -0.38 -0.49 22 2.13% 1.42
Test for DifferencePanel 1: Low to High Panel 2: High to Low
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Appendix E.  Dividend Change Related CAARs (Extended Sample) 
This table reports the same dividend change related CAARs as shown in Table IV using extended sample. The 121 announcements of frequency 
increase are further separated into 95 dividend-increase, 18 dividend-decrease and 8 no dividend change in Panel 1. The 22 confirmed 
announcements of frequency decrease are further separated into 8 dividend-increase, 12 dividend-decrease and 2 no dividend change in Panel 2. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
 
Event window CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events
[-20;+20] 3.40% 2.34** 2.67*** 95 1.10% 0.30 0.22 18 0.25% 0.63 0.50 8
[-20;+10] 3.86% 2.60*** 3.31*** 95 0.74% -0.12 -0.10 18 -0.42% 0.23 0.19 8
[-20;+5] 3.58% 2.46** 3.11*** 95 1.86% 0.18 0.14 18 -0.22% 0.51 0.26 8
[-10;+20] 2.72% 2.37** 2.64*** 95 1.18% 0.58 0.50 18 3.02% 1.22 1.26 8
[-10;+10] 3.23% 2.88*** 3.49*** 95 0.91% 0.20 0.19 18 2.09% 0.94 0.97 8
[-10;+5] 2.98% 2.92*** 3.39*** 95 2.08% 0.62 0.51 18 2.14% 1.53 1.15 8
[-5;+20] 2.08% 2.27** 2.45** 95 0.85% 0.18 0.17 18 2.97% 0.91 1.22 8
[-5;+10] 2.50% 2.90*** 3.37*** 95 0.49% -0.26 -0.28 18 2.41% 0.74 1.03 8
[-5;+5] 2.21% 2.89*** 3.27*** 95 1.55% -0.03 -0.03 18 2.74% 1.34 1.36 8
[-1;+3] 2.53% 3.71*** 5.21*** 95 0.87% -0.83 -0.93 18 0.19% 0.56 0.98 8
Event window CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events CAAR SCS test Patell Z No. Events
[-20;+20] 0.47% 0.28 0.32 8 -10.00% -2.18** -2.81*** 12 -8.72% -1.81* -1.63301 2
[-20;+10] 1.93% 0.43 0.58 8 -8.49% -2.04** -2.66*** 12 -5.14% -1.15 -1.52 2
[-20;+5] 1.31% 0.26 0.39 8 -3.64% -1.35 -1.62 12 -7.00% -1.6 -1.76* 2
[-10;+20] -1.79% -0.25 -0.22 8 -8.10% -2.27** -2.13** 12 -8.90% -4.15*** -1.49 2
[-10;+10] -0.28% -0.01 -0.01 8 -6.26% -1.64 -1.92* 12 -5.11% -1.74 -1.35 2
[-10;+5] -0.80% -0.28 -0.3 8 -1.19% -0.83 -0.58 12 -6.64% -3.22*** -1.62 2
[-5;+20] -1.15% -0.23 -0.17 8 -10.93% -3.15*** -2.98*** 12 -3.12% -1.26 -0.92 2
[-5;+10] 0.44% 0.13 0.12 8 -9.00% -2.33** -3.00*** 12 0.06% -0.58 -0.71 2
[-5;+5] -0.08% -0.19 -0.2 8 -3.97% -1.62 -1.71* 12 -1.87% -1.05 -1.03 2
[-1;+3] 1.06% 0.36 0.52 8 0.16% -0.03 -0.04 12 -5.23% -2.08** -2.58*** 2
Panel 1: From Low to High
Panel 2:  From High to Low
 Dividend Increase  Dividend Decrease  Dividend No Change
 Dividend Increase  Dividend Decrease  Dividend No Change
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Appendix F.  Multivariate Analysis (Extended Sample)  
This table reports the same multivariate analysis results reported in Table V using extended sample including 143 frequency change 
announcements. 2 observations are missed during firm characteristics gathering process. All models include industry fixed effects (19 singleton 
observations are dropped). The definitions of all variables can be found in Section 4.2.1 ~ 4.2.3. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are 
based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Variance inflation factors are also calculated as supplementary tests for multicollinearity issues.  
 
CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-5;+20] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-10;+20]
Intercept -0.0158595 -0.0426238 -0.013691 -0.0410854
(-0.41) (-0.66) (-0.24) (-0.64)
FreqChange 0.0056139** 0.0151864*** 0.0132173*** 0.016178***
(1.97) (3.19) (3.12) (3.38)
Monthly -0.0384222 -0.1016388 -0.1158857** -0.1388298**
(-1.03) (-1.64) (-2.10) (-2.22)
DivChange 0.4125899* 0.4227752 0.3143216 0.4179965
(1.90) (1.17) (0.97) (1.15)
Firm Size -0.003491 -0.0028066 -0.0023271 -0.0029764
(-0.85) (-0.41) (-0.38) (-0.43)
Book-to-Market 0.02653 0.0477948* 0.0421757* 0.0552975**
(1.64) (1.77) (1.76) (2.04)
Return Volatility 0.1286173 -0.4014046 -0.7671501 -0.619293
(0.18) (-0.34) (-0.73) (-0.52)
ROA -0.0897128 0.0989775 0.0005982 0.1728513
(-0.61) (0.40) (0.00) (0.70)
Free Cash 0.195994* 0.0782975 0.0871039 0.0512316
(1.65) (0.39) (0.49) (0.26)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 122 122 122 122
Max VIF 3.18 3.18 3.18 3.18
Mean VIF 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88
Adj R-squared 0.0862 0.0536 0.1288 0.1647
F-Statistics 2.08 2.04 1.84 2.36
